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Muslim brotherhoods (t u r u q), most notably the Mouri-
des, have been considered a dominant factor of po-
litical influence at the local and national levels in
Senegal. The recent election campaigns, however,
seem to indicate a changing influence of religious au-
thorities on a local level. Most of the opposition par-
ties formed a coalition which intended to break up
the dominance of the Socialist Party, an intention
which was successfully realized. International politi-
cal – not necessarily homogeneous religious – net-
works and new means of communication were deci-
sive for the victory of the new president, Abdoulaye
Wade, in 2001. 
T r a n s n a t i o n a l
Senegalese Politics 
in France
From the colonization period up to the
1990s, a large number of national and local
religious authorities considerably support-
ed the ruling government in Senegal by
guaranteeing the French governor's control
over rural areas or by expressing clear re-
commendations to the voters after the Inde-
pendence. Nevertheless, the mutual loyalty
of the secular and the religious powers has
not always functioned without resistance. In
the middle of the 19t h century, the French
governor Faidherbe, who counted on the
purchased loyalty of local marabouts in
order to control rural areas, was fought by El
Haj Oumar. Senegal's first president after
the Independence, Léopold Sédar Senghor
(who was Catholic), continued to cooperate
with the authorities of the leading Sufi
brotherhood. The exchange of material and
immaterial goods could be proceeded with
by the purchase of votes against land rights
or tax advantages for the marabouts. Seng-
hor's successor, Abdou Diouf, whose family
belongs to the tariqa Tijaniyya, dealt also
with the Mouride and the Tijaniyy mara-
bouts, particularly with the general caliph of
the Tijaniyya, Abdoul Aziz Sy (1905–1997).
These links were visible on a symbolic level,
when representatives of the Senegalese
government assisted at national or regional
pilgrimages (the Tijaniyy Gamou in Tiva-
vouane or the Mouride Magal in Touba), or
when the drainage system was renewed
and maintained by important public fund-
ing because of the event.1 The ruling
Mouride general caliph Serigne Saliou
Mbacké presented himself until the end of
the 1990s as a discrete religious authority
not wanting to get involved in political af-
fairs. Hence at that time, the leading candi-
date of the opposition party, Abdoulaye
Wade, visiting the Mouride capital Touba
very frequently, openly showed his need for
the protection and counsel of his personal
Mouride marabout. 
Re-privatization of religion
During the presidential election cam-
paign in 2000, the behaviour of most of the
local and national religious authorities
changed significantly. Marabouts tended to
avoid expressing themselves in favour of ei-
ther the ruling socialist party or for the op-
position parties. There was only the general
caliph of the Tijaniyya, Mansour Sy, who ap-
pealed to believers to vote for Diouf. How-
ever, Diouf was defeated even in Sy's own
electoral circumscription in the holy city of
the Tijaniyya, Tivavouane. The large coali-
tion of the opposition parties, named 'Alter-
nance 2000', won the presidential elections,
resulting in the victory of the Mouride Ab-
doulaye Wade as the first non-socialist pres-
ident after 40 years. Although Wade be-
longs to the liberal PDS (Parti Démocratique
Sénégalais), former Marxist parties like And
J ë f / P A D S and socialist dissidents like Ibrahi-
ma Niasse joined the coalition in order to
break the 20-year domination of Abdou
Diouf. 
The first act of the new president just after
his victory was a personal pilgrimage to his
marabout in Touba, in order to thank him
for support and prayer. Serigne Saliou
Mbacké had refused to openly express him-
self for Wade, but the fact that Wade pre-
sented himself always as a Mouride t a l i b é n o
doubt had a positive effect on his election.
But the links between religious and political
authorities at the micro and the macro lev-
els are far more complex, and we need to
enlarge the general context of these elec-
tions in order to understand Wade's success.
Transnational networks
Studies on Senegalese migration have
heavily focused on Mouride trade net-
w o r k s .2 The increasing migration of Sene-
galese peasants to the urban areas and the
international migration to Europe (France,
Italy, Spain and Germany) and, currently, to
the United States (especially New York),
have reinforced the creation of transnation-
al social spaces. The latter are not necessari-
ly exclusively based on religious practices or
on membership in a d a h i r a. Communities
have cross-cutting ties and individuals be-
long to several networks and (interest)
groups at once. It is sure that the Mouride
economic networks are some of the best or-
ganized groups with an undoubtable finan-
cial influence. Nevertheless, we have ob-
served that individual and collective mi-
grants' activities in migration, particularly in
and around Paris, considerably focus on the
will for political change. The large political
coalition that aimed at breaking the domi-
nation of President Abdou Diouf was united
above religious or ideological orientations.
During the electoral meetings in Paris, for
example, financial affairs were controlled by
three women: one Mouride and one
Catholic woman who belong to the main
opposition party PDS, and one Tijaniyy
woman who is a member of the former
Marxist party And J ë f/PADS. This example
reflects the attitude of most of the activists
as well of most of the voters. Religious is-
sues were not openly discussed during the
meetings in and around Paris – on the con-
trary, the laic character of the constitution
was underlined several times by speakers.
Nevertheless, most of the practising
Mourides were conscious of the fact that in
the person of Abdoulaye Wade, a Mouride
t a l i b é was leading the main opposition
party. In the past, several marabouts got
into trouble for having supported the gov-
ernment – a government which has been in-
creasingly contested. The dissatisfaction
with the ruling government and the difficult
economic situation of the population since
the devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994
have increased the will for political change,
particularly among the youth, whose partic-
ipation rate in elections was very low until
2000. Hence, it became a growing risk for
marabouts to openly support the ruling
government by the expression of n d i g a ls
(which means a general order, in this case a
clear recommendation for a vote). A mem-
ber of the Senate, the second chamber in
Senegal, proudly said during a meeting (in
France) of the opposition: 'I have convinced
my marabout not to give any n d i g a l, al-
though he usually supported the Socialist
Party.' This statement was met with ap-
plause, reflecting a belief in the real chance
of political change. We can assume that his-
torical structures of religious authority were
largely contested on an individual level.
People's will to take autonomous political
decisions, independently from the advice of
marabouts, was obvious. This evolution was
the fruitful ground for Abdoulaye Wade's
strategy to count on transnational net-
works. Wade himself organized his political
campaign from his residence in Versailles
near Paris. Political claims of the migrants
constituted the central part of his political
programme: a favourite customs policy,
governmental aid for investments in Sene-
gal, bilateral social insurance agreements,
human living conditions for migrants in
France, etc. Wade systematically addressed
the migrants during electoral meetings that
were organized in the collective workers'
homes in and around Paris. He presented
himself as the only candidate who is close to
the migrants and who best knows their
problems. 
Migrants as vote
m u l t i p l i c a t o r s
The central reason for this election cam-
paign outside of Senegal was the impor-
tance of the migrants as new intermediaries
between the political leaders and the voters
in Senegal, especially in rural areas, where
religious authorities have played the role of
counsellors in electoral affairs for a long
time. In Paris, at the end of the official cam-
paign on Friday night before the elections,
several speakers urged the activists present
to influence their relatives and friends in
Senegal: 'The campaign is officially closed,
but it is not forbidden to phone home.' This
strategy worked also in Senegal, where peo-
ple from Dakar came to visit their family be-
fore the day of elections in order to con-
vince them to choose Wade. Abdou Diouf,
who was conscious of the importance of the
opposition parties in urban areas, sched-
uled the elections during the A ï d feast, hop-
ing that people from Dakar or other cities
would celebrate the A ï d in their home vil-
lages instead of voting in the city. This plan
failed, as residents of the big cities orga-
nized themselves very well in order to be
back in town in time. Ultimately their pres-
ence in rural areas was favourable for the
opposition. Wade's strategy of multiplying
votes from migrants back to Senegal and
from the cities back to the village was very
successful. Another important aspect was
the growing speed of communication
thanks to new media and to mobile phones.
The private press company Sudonline pub-
lished the main opposition journal Sud Quo-
t i d i e n online, so that Senegalese abroad
were very well informed about the political
and economic situation at home – particu-
larly about the corruption scandals in which
members of the socialist government were
implicated. In Paris, the printed version of
the online journal circulated amongst mi-
grants who, in majority, have no access to
Internet. Another important factor for
Wade's victory in 2000 was the efficient sur-
vey of the elections by journalists who as-
sisted at the counting of the votes, and
communicated the results via mobile
phones to the private radio station of the
'Sud' group. The mirror effect continued via
satellite radios which spread the results in
Paris. Senegalese migrants celebrated
Wade's victory in the suburbs of the French
capital as well as in Dakar even before the









a n n o u n c e m e n t
o f the party.
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